The final session of the Spring Semester Austrian Economics
Forum at NC State University cover the topic of Banking. There are basically two camps in the Austrian School when it comes to banking—100%
reserve banking and free banking with fractional reserves. For this session we covered the article “Fractional Reserve Free Banking: Some Quibbles” by Philipp Bagus and David Howden in The Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics
(2010, vol. 13, no. 4, pp. 29-55) and Selgin’s response found here or here.
Personally, I am in the free banking camp, but I think that
there are strong economic arguments for getting close to 100% reserves. As I will explain below, it might be the case
that while the objections to Fractional Reserve Free Banking (FRFB) are true,
they might be so small that the positives outweigh the negatives.
Overall, I cannot express how disappointed I was with the
Bagus and Howden article. We have
already covered Bagus’ book, The Tragedy of the Euro, in the first session this semester (here) and I thought the
sections that we read were thin. While
there is a decent underlining argument there, the scholarship was weaker than
what I was expecting. Unfortunately,
this article proved to have the same flaw—weak scholarship. Furthermore, Howden gave a named lecture at
the Mises Institute’s Austrian Scholar’s Conference. He explained what he meant by a
“quibble.” He meant that the argument
for free banking was so weak that to argue in favor of it is a mere
quibble! [Wow!]
When presenting an argument of an opponent, one should
always give the benefit of the doubt, define the terms in the most generous
manner and cast it in the most favorable light.
If you can still destroy the argument, then your case is solid. Unfortunately, this is not the approach that
Bagus and Howden take in their article.
They assume narrow interpretations and unfavorable conditions. Simply put, they are not generous to their
opponents. As a result, the FRFB side
can point out that the overly narrow case does not apply and that the argument
was misconstrued. In the session, the
criticism actually fell less on Bagus and Howden and more on the editorial staff
and reviewers at the QJAE. Basically, the sentiment was, “How did this
article see the light of day?”
Due to the poor scholarship, Selgin is able to destroy their
argument and make them look ridiculous and arrogant, which is too bad because
Bagus and Howden are not dumb guys.
Let’s take a quick look at the exchange, from Selgin…
According to Bagus and Howden (2010,
p. 36), “Selgin starts his analysis by assessing changes in the demand for
money, not distinguishing between the demand for commodity money (money proper)
and money substitutes.” Actually, my chapter concerning how free banks deal
with changes in the demand for money is titled “Changes in the Demand for Inside
Money” (my emphasis), where “inside money” means more or less the same
thing as Bagus and Howden’s “money substitutes.”
It is simple points such as these that allow Selgin to
skewer Bagus and Howden. It is as if
they simply did not take the time to understand Selgin’s argument. If this was an isolated incident, maybe we
can let that slide by, but it is unrelenting.
Bagus and Howden are simply misrepresenting the FRFB argument.
So here is my analysis (take away) from the ongoing
exchange. First, I think that those who
support the Free Banking position are better debaters than those on the 100%
Reserve side. I say this because it
seems that the 100%ers are willing to fall back to the moral argument as
opposed to fighting on economic ground.
While there is nothing inherently wrong in arguing against the
legitimacy of converting a bailment into a deposit (an asset for the bank), my
point is that it is not an economic
argument.
The Bagus and Howden article does identify the weak points
of the FRFB position, but they discredit their position against FRFB with their
sloppy scholarship. There are two major
(economic) weaknesses in the FRFB position and it is due to these weaknesses
that I have strong reservations on the FRFB position.
Before we can get into these points, we first need to make
the distinction between the different types of credit. A problem in the literature is that it seems
that each author has his own way of defining credit and thus the arguments
become confusing. I will use the
definitions Machlup uses in The Stock Market, Credit and Capital Formation (1931). He distinguishes between transfer credit and created
credit. (While there is a third
category, we don’t need to worry about it here.)
Transfer credit is the sort that stems from my placing money
into a loaning institution and it is borrowed by another. This form of a loan matches the deposit
banking that Rothbard outlines in The Mystery of Banking. The second type
of credit is the sort that materializes out of nowhere. An example of this is when the Federal
Reserve buys a bond and credits the sellers account. Where did that new money come from? It came from a big, black hole of
nothingness. The money (credit) was
created.
So the first weakness in Selgin’s presentation of the FRFB
system is that he starts his analysis with an economy, and a banking system,
that is fully loaned up. In other words,
he is starting with banks balancing their “average net reserve demand” equal to
zero. (Selgin 1988, p. 73) I think that
this is a weakness, not because of the logic that Selgin engages in, but
because that this assumes way a major point of credit fueled inflation—the
process to get to a fully loaned up system.
I think that it is true that if we start with a fully loaned up banking
system with no malinvestments, then yes, the system is fairly stable. However, if in the process of getting to this
fully loaned up state, we create malinvestments along the way, then the system
is not stable. There will be the classic
Austrian Boom/Bust Cycle.
The next weakness that is found in the FRFB system centers
on the precautionary reserves. If the
banking system is fully loaned up, it is vulnerable to any fluctuations in
people’s willingness to hold on to cash (or not hold onto cash). Thus, each bank will hold onto some reserves
to insulate itself from the day-to-day fluctuations and from any unforeseen
changes in market conditions. The bank
will lose money if it holds onto too much cash reserves and put itself at risk
if it holds onto too few. So far, so
good. This choice is an entrepreneurial
one and markets should be able to handle this.
So here is my concern.
Suppose that for whatever reason there is an increase in the demand to
hold onto cash. This holding onto cash
is deferred consumption. In other words,
it is saving. Now, if nothing else
happens there is a decrease in the demand for the goods and services that the
cash holders are choosing not to buy. This
change in demand will then spread throughout the economy and the relative price
changes will signal to entrepreneurs how to re-coordinate the economy.
Many who support FRFB system (like Selgin and Horwitz) argue
that this savings can be converted into transfer credit. If the cash holders are holding onto an
additional $1,000 per time period (e.g., each month), then the banks can loan
out that additional sum of $1,000. They
argue that this is merely transfer credit and not created credit.
Therefore, this is not a problem to worry about. While, it is true that this is not created
credit, because the cash holders are indeed saving, there are, however, a few
concerns.
First, as soon as these cash holders revert to their prior spending/cash
holding patterns, then the banks need to call in those loans. In the example above, the banks need to call
in the $1,000. Calling in loans may create
a large disruption in the economic patterns.
If a business started a project and the loan is called in, there is no
effective difference between liquidating this sort of a project and liquidating
a malinvestment from an artificial boom.
Secondly, when the loan is made, there are nonneutral
economic effects that stem from this loan.
When businessman A gets the loan, he will create a spending pattern that
is unique. New equilibria are
generated. This pattern will necessarily
be different from the pattern generated by the reduction in demand by the
saver. While this may not seem to big a
major problem to a well functioning economy, it is a point of concern to the
extent that these patterns are at odds with the savers. Most likely, the extent of concern on this
point seems to be an empirical matter.
The 100%ers are assuming that prices are flexible and will
quickly adjust. The FRFB supporters are
assuming that prices are not quite as flexible and so they convert the savings
into transfer credit. However, to me
this seems to be compounding the problem instead of solving it. If prices adjust slowly, then why are we
creating a second pattern to overlay which will reinforce or offset the prior
pattern generated from savings? I think
that prices are stickier as we get closer to consumers. While gasoline prices change by the penny
each day, most consumer items target price points (e.g., $9.99, $29.99,
etc.). As we move further away from the
consumer, we see less fixation on price points, but we do see more longer term
contracts. Again, this is a call for
further research. I suspect that there
is some economic research on this, but since the other schools of economic
thought tend to ignore the structure of production, I doubt that the answers
are readily available. If someone has a
suggestion of where to look, I would be interested in these sources.