AEF Spring 2016 #1--Hayek's "The Meaning of Competition"

For the spring semester at NC State University, we decided to continue to look at some of the more foundational articles in Austrian Economics.  One of the more famous is F.A. Hayek's "The Meaning of Competition."  It was originally presented as a lecture at Princeton University on May 20, 1946.

Our session took place on January 29, 2016.  It was attended by several graduate and undergraduate students.  Roy Cordato and I (Paul Cwik) were the hosts.  Cordato presented the article this week and outlined four major points in Hayek's article.

1. There are major conceptual flaws in the model of Perfect Competition (PC).
2. The use of Perfect Competition (PC) as a Normative Benchmark is misleading and dangerous.
3. Hayek presents a proper role in which to view competition.
4. Hayek creates a brief outline of the Austrian Theory of Monopoly.

Let's take a closer look at each.

The major conceptual flaws in the PC model begin with the assumption of Perfect Knowledge.  By making the assumption of perfect knowledge, the economist is essentially assuming away the problem.  In fact with the assumption of perfect knowledge the entire need for competitive behavior disappears.  It is the absence of competitive activities.  Why?  It is simply due to the fact that all of the supply curves (cost curves) and demand curves are fully known.  If all of the curves are known then the problem is one of simply grinding through a mechanical process.  The problem reduces to "given these two lines, please compute where they cross."  Austrians define "competition," which we will see in Point #3 below, as a rivalrous process.  Furthermore, the question of how the market actually works in the real world is never really investigated.  The perfectly competitive model is a static (no time) and competition is a sequential series of equations to be solved.

The second point that Cordato presented was using the PC model as a benchmark.  The PC model was originally designed to be a tool to show a sequence of cause and effect.  For example, suppose that a firm or an industry was using steel as an input.  If we see that the price of steel rises, what will the effects of this change have on the industry?  The PC model does a good job of tracing out the cause and effects of this question.  Unfortunately, the tool has become the entire toolbox.  It was originally supposed to look at very narrow questions.  However if you walk into a mainstream International Trade class, one of the very first assumptions that is made is to assume perfect competition.  This assumption is the beginning of the building of the Heckscher-Ohlin model.  (I just pulled my old International Trade textbook off my shelf and it literally says, "First, we assume that perfect competition prevails in both output and factor markets."  When every model starts with the PC model, it creates a false standard.  On one end of the spectrum is perfect competition and on the other end is monopoly.  Everyone knows that monopoly is bad and so the thing on the other end must be good.  What's that thing?  Why it is nothing less than perfect competition.  And if we even look at the name, we know that it is something to desire--it's even called PERFECT.  What's not to like?

Actually, there is a lot not to like about using the PC model as the benchmark.  The rules and regulations that government policies create set the PC model as the goal.  This goal setting is misleading and dangerous.  Let's take a look at a simple example.  In the PC model, there are many, many sellers.  In fact there are so many that not a single one of them can influence or affect the price; they are "price takers."  If a company is larger than simply being a mere price taker, then to get us closer to perfect competition, the government needs to intervene and make it smaller.  Think of how silly this standard truly is.  When I go to work I drive past two gas stations and one's price is a penny lower than the other.  Clearly, one of them is not a price taker.  So they are too big!  When I look for used DVDs, I see that there are several prices.  Clearly these sellers are also not price takers.  The idea of setting "price taking" as a goal is confusing an assumption of the PC model with an outcome.

The third point that Cordato brought up was on how we should look at competition.  Competition is a rivalrous process.  Why do sports teams play the game?  They do so because regardless of what the teams looks like on paper, any one team can beat another team on a given day.  Furthermore, how many are needed to have competition?  When I ask my students this question, most will say at least two.  However, I ask how many run or swim.  I then ask if they ever keep time.  Why would they do that?  With whom are they competing?  They are competing with themselves.  The minimum number needed for competition is one.  Even if you are the only producer in a market, there are always potential rivals.  Leonard Read once said that getting rid of competition was like standing in a stream with a broom trying to sweep the water away.  With one stroke, the water is gone for a moment, but then it comes rushing back in.  To be a natural monopolist, it means that one must out compete everyone else on every single vector of competition there can be.  That means one must have better prices, better quality, better hours, better location, better customer service, and so forth.  It must be better in absolutely everything.  If one area slips, say customer service, then that opens the door for a niche competitor to get into the market.  And besides, how would a customer view such a monopoly? If it has better everything, then consumers would be very happy.  However, the PC model says that only small price taking companies are good for customers.  How counter-intuitive!  In the real world, the companies that please the customers by doing a better job grow larger.

Hayek says that competition is the mechanism that allows entrepreneurs to acquire the knowledge that the PC model assumes to be known.  Competition tells us who will serve us well.  It is a "Discovery Process."

Finally, Hayek presents an Austrian Theory of Monopoly.  Cordato was surprised at how well Hayek and Rothbard line up on this point.  For them, the only barrier is government.  In contrast to this point are Mises and Kirzner.  They allow for the possibility of a resource monopoly.  While this might seem to be a minor technical point that never occurs in the real world (and it truly is), it is one of the few instances where Rothbard and Hayek are not on the same side as Mises.

And finally, finally, we do have fun in these sessions.  One of the fun things that arose (at least to a geeky economist such as myself) was this turn of phrase:

Private Sector:
"Where there's a problem, that's where the money is."

Public Sector:
"Where there's money, that's where the problem is."

Austrian Economics Forum Fall 2015 Recap

After quite the hiatus, I suppose that I should try to get back to blogging.  

North Carolina State University is the location for the open to the public campus club: "Austrian Economics Forum."  Since its founding the idea was to promote the development of Austrian Economics from the Graduate-Student level and above.  This year we have decided to open it up to include undergraduate students and any other interested parties.  The idea is to go back and start filling in the foundations.

In an attempt to get back to the roots I presented several lectures. The first was on October 16, 2015. Here is the link: Dr. Paul F. Cwik 10-16-2016 NCSU - Menger & the Early Austrians  



(The preview picture, which was automatically edited by this cite, clearly thinks that I was excited about this point on the Methodenstreit.)

In this talk I cover the four most significant contributions made by Carl Menger.  I also take a look at Eugen von Bohm-Bawerk and Friedrich von Wieser. I present a little of who they were and I explore their most important contributions to the science of economics.  Additionally, I add some important points made by Philip Wicksteed, William Smart and David I. Green.

The second lecture that I presented took place on November 1, 2015.  Here is the link to that lecture: Dr. Paul F. Cwik on Austrian Capital and Interest Theory  



In this lecture, I build on the first lecture.  I begin with Bohm-Bawerk's review of others' ideas on Capital and Interest.  Then we build his positive theory and compare it with John Bates Clark.  In addition to this, I also look at the way in which the Austrians view interest rates (based upon the subjective notion of time preference) and compare it with the mainstream view, which is based upon both subjective and objective factors.

I then build the Structure of Production and stress the importance of not only capital substitution, but capital complementarity.

The third lecture was a presentation of the Austrian Theory of the Business Cycle, which builds upon the first two lectures.  At some point in the near future, it will be posted to Youtube and I will link it here.

Extending the Tree of Knowledge through Branching

A striking feature of the Great Depression was the number of bank failures. Between 1930 and 1933, over 9,000 banks suspended operations, never to conduct business again.  The problem became so desperate that newly-elected President Roosevelt declared a “Bank Holiday” in which an inspection was to occur and only the sound ones would be allowed to reopen.  There are many reasons for the number of bank failures, but curiously Canada’s banking system didn’t suffer the same fate.  In fact Canada had zero bank failures between 1927 and 1980.  (That’s over fifty years without a failure!)  What could be the difference?  The answer is simple: branch banking was allowed in Canada, but not allowed in the US.  The simple principle of diversification was denied to the US banking industry and when the crisis hit, the banks fell like dominos.

Today, there is another industry set up for a similar failure: US colleges and universities—private institutions in particular.  In the same way that the US imposed “unit banking” on the financial industry, we currently have a similar anti-competitive, and anti-diversification, system targeting higher education.

It wasn’t until just recently that I discovered this situation firsthand.

I teach Economics and Finance at the University of Mount Olive in North Carolina.  UMO is a small, private, Christian and non-profit school in eastern North Carolina.  In January 2014, we launched our first graduate program, a Masters of Business Administration.  As a part of our business strategy we decided to launch the program entirely online.  The original idea was once we had the program up and running, we would look into seated and hybrid courses.  The business strategy was simple.  We wanted to diversify.  First, by adding a Graduate Program and, second, by extending ourselves outside of our region.  We had all seen the ads on TV by other schools pitching their online degree programs.  We wanted to get into that market where the world could provide us with students.  At UMO, a majority of our students are adult learners and many of those are affiliated with the military.  Working around deployments is nothing new for us.  For example, I have had a student who had to finish his Money and Banking course from Qatar.  So the faculty’s acceptance of the idea of an online degree for adult learners from all over the country came naturally.

The ability of a small Southern, Christian school to diversify is necessary.  As a regional school, we have been putting too many of our financial eggs in a single basket.  Some have made the quiet projection that within the next 5 years, 3 to 4 North Carolina colleges may disappear.  Mount Olive has had its fair share of financial difficulties, has successfully emerged from them and is better as a result.  We have learned, the hard way, the difficulties for a private school competing against tax-supported public schools.  We owe it to ourselves, our students and most importantly to our alumni that we not simply survive, but flourish.  (Imagine having a degree from a school that no longer exists.)

Last January, I had the honor to teach the very first MBA course offered at Mount Olive.  Of course, the first class drew heavily from our Alumni.  Over the following semesters, I have seen graduates of other schools join our program, however, they were still local to Mount Olive’s region.  This result, of course, makes sense because people who aren’t all that familiar with the school won’t apply.  Then I noticed that our reach extended west of I-95 and into the Triangle Area.  And so I asked our program director, almost off-handed, when we would see students from Virginia and South Carolina.  It was then that I learned the awful truth: we were not allowed to compete for students in other states!  It is against the law.  (My jaw hit the floor.)

In 2010, the US Department of Education issued a regulation that stated colleges and universities could only offer online programs in states where they also had a physical presence.  In July 2011, the DC District Court struck down this regulation.  However, the Department of Education appealed and in 2013 it issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM).  Simply, the DOE announced that it intends to make a rule on the topic of State Authorization.  And this is where we stand today.

So while there is technically no Federal Rule preventing a college from advertising online programs across state lines, individual states have their own individual laws that prevent competition.  In other words, in order for the University of Mount Olive to compete across the country, UMO would have to request special authorization from each and every state that has a State Authorization law, which apparently is every state except maybe Hawaii.  Furthermore, the state would have to specifically name the school that it allows to compete with its own local schools (that means we’d have to lobby other states’ legislators—which is never cheap and hardly a guaranteed result).  There are other loophole-ish ways around some state laws.  Apparently some state laws are fairly vague.  In fact, I was told that some of the schools that advertise across the country have, in some states, a single guy with a phone in an office that creates their “physical presence.”  I am not sure if this is truly the case, but as with all loophole strategies, a single court case or amendment to state legislation can crush that approach.  (If you are interested in reading legalese for yourself, you can find it in the Code of Federal Regulations, Chapter 34, Section 600.9 State Authorization, http://www.ecfr.gov/.  Enjoy!)  The reality of these government restrictions is the creation of a chilling effect to new and innovative methods of delivering education; and it is a costly one as well, both in terms of schools lobbying for authorization and in terms of lost revenue. 

Diversifying how a school offers its courses is an act of entrepreneurship.  Reaching beyond the school’s natural regional limitation is also an act of entrepreneurship.  Both are necessary for a healthy and growing institution.  I teach entrepreneurship in my economics classes, and I see case after case of entrepreneurial ideas being squashed by the heavy hand of government.  In many cases, state legislators want to restrict online competition from “outside” educational institutions, especially if the competitor is a for-profit entity.  Regardless of the stated reason, it is the same protectionist argument that David Hume and Adam Smith fought against centuries ago.  It is the same argument made against bank branching in the early 20^th century.  In each and every case, the result is that cost of protection exceeds the benefits.

The greatest strength of US Higher Education is that there is free and open competition.  Unlike the failing public K-12 system, where students are assigned to schools, US colleges and universities must persuade customers to freely opt for one’s school.  This competition ensures higher standards and lower costs.  Increasingly, each decade the government erodes this market connection through tax subsidies, grants, and so forth, but nevertheless, the link still exists.  At UMO, we are very aware of the importance of each and every student.  These students consciously choose to enroll with us and not somewhere else.  It is difficult enough to compete with institutions that benefit from the taxes that come out of my paycheck.  And it is beyond enraging to learn that we are banned from competing across state lines.  Nevertheless, I am optimistic.  Technology seems to find interesting ways around bureaucratic obstacles. 

The best solution is to extricate government from the higher education market.  Although such a goal may be wildly optimistic, we can at least do away with these State Authorization laws.  When the crisis hit the financial markets in the early years of the Great Depression, the result was that more than 9,000 banks closed their doors forever.  It is no secret that today there is a bubble in Higher Education.  If schools are unable to properly diversify, I shudder to think about how many Alumni will have degrees from schools which will no longer exist?

Secondary Consequences--Blackmailing Batman

One of the most important concepts that we stress in economics is that of secondary consequences.  Too often, we simply focus on the immediate, on the short-term, on what happens to a particular group.  Economics teaches us that we need to go beyond a narrow focus.  In the movie "Batman: The Dark Knight," an employee discovers Batman's secret identity and thinks that he should be paid $10 million a year for the rest of his life to keep quiet.  Here is the scene:

The reason why this scene is funny is because the extortionist has not thought his proposition through.  He hasn't looked beyond the immediate.  What will Batman's reaction be to someone who wants to release his secret?  What will happen to him?  Will he ever be able to enjoy that money?

Earlier this week I attended my Town's Council Meeting.  There was a proposition to limit Electronic Gaming Businesses by saying that these businesses had to stay at least a quarter mile away from each other.  What they are failing to do is think about the secondary consequences.  Let's set aside the issue of whether such a rule will achieve its purpose--to frighten away such businesses from the Town of Garner.  (It won't.  It's like preventing Burger King from locating near a McDonald's because we fear that people are getting too fat.) 

The secondary consequences of creating these spacial regulations is that the town is carving out islands of monopoly.  Each business gets its own territory and all competitors are prevented from encroaching on your business.  The cost of enforcing this rule is picked up by the government.  It's a sweet deal for those already in business.  As an island of monopoly, the business doesn't have to compete as hard and so the product to the consumers is inferior and at a higher price.

So if the Town Council hates competition and wants to stick it to the consumers, then by all means let's pass this rule.  Or perhaps, we should think it through before we go up against Batman.

Competition vs. Conflict

Last week President Obama said that we do not live in autarky.  In other words, one person did not build a business, he had help.  Well, duh!  No one argues that we should each live in solitude, not even the more ardent Randian Objectivist.  


So what is he really getting at?  He is trying to emphasize that communities need to work together.  Fine.  However, his emphasis is on the public sector's "contribution" to society.  Here are a few thoughts on this...


First, before government can make any contribution to society, it must first take from society.  Just because the public sector has spent money on an area, e.g., roads, schools, etc., it does not mean that such things would not be produced if the private sector was left alone.  In deed, the public sector tends to crowd out the private sector whenever it does anything.  Additionally, the public sector is unable to determine whether it is spending money efficiently and thus is always more wasteful of resources than the private sector.


Secondly, autarky may be a starting point for economic theorizing, but it does not mean that we stay there.  Austrians almost always start with the assumption of a lone individual on an island when developing theories of capital and interest.  However, one of the most important insights of all of economics is the Law of Comparative Advantage, which Mises takes to the level of the individual and calls it the Law of Association.  It says that when we specialize and trade, we are made better off.


Finally, many on the left simply do not understand how a free society works.  At the center of the economic system all they see is one person trying to out-compete all rivals--doing whatever it takes to get resources for that dollar of profit.  This conception of the market economy is a skewed envisioning by Marx and the left.  


While there is competition, to be sure, the market cannot operate at odds with itself.  The market is less about competition than it is about harmony.  Consumers have preferences that are subjective and unknown to the producers of goods and services.  Manufacturers have resources and plans to make goods, but do not know which goods to make and in what quantity or quality.  The problem that faces every society is to convert the resources into  goods and services, but not just random goods and services.  They need to make items that satisfy the most intense wants and desires first, and then work down the consumers' preference list.  The market coordinates the conversion of these resources through the use of the price system.  The result is a harmony of action.  Different firms, through trial-and-error, through profit and loss, through competition discover the best combination of resource blends.  The result is that more people are served with less waste than any other system ever.


The reason why the left, Marxists in particular, focus on the single aspect of competition is that they view the world through the lens of conflict.  Marxism is born from Hegelianism.  Hegel saw the world in terms on conflict.  There is a thesis, which is today's mainstream.  Through time, a reaction builds in opposition to it, the antithesis.  A conflict eventually ensues and a synthesis emerges.  For Marx, the Monarchy was the thesis and the exploited were the antithesis.  The result that emerged from the French and American revolutions were the rise of Capitalism.  Capitalism is the new thesis, in which the proletariat will rise up against the bourgeoisie.  The result of this conflict will be Communism.  To the Marxists, the totality of history is conflict, so why should the internal workings of a free society be any different?


What a horrid way to look at the world--conflict, fighting and death!  A vision of a free society is one of liberty and one of individual responsibility.  In this vision, I need you and rely on you so that I can better myself.  When I trade with you, we are not in conflict, we are mutually helping each other.  We are both made better off by the trade.  A free society is the furthest thing from autarky.  If, in college, our President read Bastiat instead of Marx,  I doubt he would be able to make such foolish statements.

Problems and Prices on FEE TV

Hollywood is known for making "magic," likewise the staff at FEE TV should also be congratulated for making me look presentable. Thank you guys.

Austrian Economics Forum Spring '12 #5--Efficiency in an Open-Ended Universe

The fifth Austrian Economics forum centered on Roy Cordato's book, Efficiency and Externalities in an Open-Ended Universe.  In particular we focused on Chapter 3, "Catallactic Efficiency: Welfare Economics."  


In traditional welfare economic analysis, we make judgments about net effects of policy.  Does this policy help more people than it hurts, or is it the reverse?  Usually, this means that the economist must make a comparison between people's subjective utilities.  This analysis is called "interpersonal utility comparisons."  Since values are subjective, such a feat is impossible.  There is no way we can judge how much a person values something, and nearly all economists agree on this point.  However, this is where the Austrians an the neoclassicals part company.


The neoclassical economists will waive their hands and say that interpersonal utility comparisons are impossible, but then they do exactly that; they make interpersonal utility comparisons.  There are some theoretical constructs that confront the problem head-on, like the Pareto Optimality measure of efficiency.  However, these sorts of approaches have very little real world application.  For example, the Pareto condition says that a policy is good if, and only if, at least one person is made better-off while no one is made worse-off.  In the real world, this is never the case.  And so, as a mental exercise, such methods are fine, but the reality is that these end up calling for maintaining the status quo.


Cordato's chapter avoids this problem.  


The first thing that needs to be made clear is the distinction between positive and normative economics.  Positive economics is pure theory.  Normative economics is a value judgement made by the analyst.  For example, positive economic analysis says that whenever the price is below the market clearing price, there will be a shortage.  An example of a normative judgment is the statement that we should set the price below the market clearing price.  Normative economics deals with "should statements."  We should do policy X but should not do policy Y.  Cordato's chapter sets positive economics aside and focuses exclusively on normative economics.


The next thing that we need to examine is the concept of an open-ended universe.  So what's that?  The opposite of a closed universe, duh.  (I know, not helpful, but I couldn't resist.)   A closed universe is one that has a final state of rest, an equilibrium point toward which the market tends.  The neoclassical position tends to start in this state, which is fine for positive analysis.  However, we are dealing with normative analysis for the real world and the real world is definitely not in equilibrium.  Even if the real world does manage to get itself into an equilibrium, it would only be there for a moment.  This is because the demand curve is based upon things like tastes and preferences and the supply curve is based upon things like expectations.  When any of those factors change, the curves shift and a new market clearing relationship emerges.  


Kirzner's approach says that we are constantly chasing these market clearing prices.  It is the entrepreneurs' actions that coordinate the economy and move us closer to market equilibria.  Cordato argues that for normative economic analysis, we should jettison the very notion of equilibrium.  Let me be clear, Cordato is not saying we should jettison equilibrium altogether.  In fact, he does say that it is perfectly legitimate to still use it for positive economic analysis.  (Personally, I like the concept of "harmony" better, but that is a different discussion.)  


It is when we deal with normative economics that we should discard equilibrium.  The reason is that we have no idea where such an equilibrium would be.  We cannot argue that in the real world that each transaction moves us closer to an equilibrium, because each transaction adds new information into the system--information that was unknown before.  As new information is added into the system, the theoretical equilibrium changes.  Thus, it is impossible to determine (either before or even after the fact) whether a trade moves us "closer" to an equilibrium or not.  So an open-ended universe says that we cannot know where these equilibria are and whether a transaction moves us closer to or further from any of these points.


While this analysis is close to the Lachmann/Shackle position of economic kaledics, it is not the same.  The difference is that Cordato says that the use of equilibrium is legitimate when doing positive economics.  Lachmann and Shackle reject the concept of equilibrium for both normative and positive economics.


So then how are we to judge which policy is better, or in economic jargon, which policy is welfare enhancing?  Cordato proposes that we use a standard of "Catallactic Efficiency."  Catallaxy is an alternate word for the economy/economics.  It comes from the Greek root "katallasso" (καταλλάσσω), which means trade or exchange.  It also means "to befriend."  


Anyway, Cordato argues that methodological individualism holds that each person has his own set of goals and his own set of information.  "[Efficiency] is to be judged by the extent to which the catallaxy encourages individuals existing in a social context, to pursue their own goals as consistently as possible." (page 62)  Cordato continues,

By its very nature, then, questions of catallactic efficiency must focus on the institutional settings in which individual actors operate.  In particular there are two overriding issues.  The first centers around the institutional settings that will best facilitate the use and discovery of information, the appropriateness and relevance of which can only be known by those who need to discover and use it.  The second concerns the institutional setting that will allow individuals to gather the necessary physical resources [and use them].  pages 62-3.

So there are two conditions to be met: the first is the ability to discover information and the second is the ability to use resources to achieve the goals sought.  The conclusion is that a laissez-faire policy is best for enhancing the welfare of the community.


Such an approach, I believe, fits well with Mises' conception of Interventionism.  Mises argued that there were three manners in which the government could intervene in an economy.  The first is the role of the impartial judge and enforcer of private property rights. When there is a dispute, the government can resolve the dispute.  Mises thought that this was a normal and healthy function of government.  The second manner is when the government buys items from the market.  Suppose that the government wants to publish its annual budget.  To do so, it needs paper.  The government taxes people and then spends that money on paper.  While there are distortionary effects that result from the governmental action, the normal market process is intact.  The demand curves for the items that the taxed people would have purchased are reduced and the demand curve for paper is increased.  The market mechanism operates normally.  


The third type of intervention is where the government stops or hinders the market mechanism from operating normally.  In this form, the government prevents trades to take place by rules, regulations, or price controls.  For example, if the government passes a law that says all toys need to be tested for lead before they can be sold, this interferes with the normal market process.  If the government says that during "a state of emergency" prices can only rise above the 30-day average by 10% interferes with the normal market process.  In the first example, people will not be able or willing to sell toys and in the second, the goods  will not be rationed according to price.  Long lines will emerge and shortages will persist.


Cordato's "Catallactic Efficiency" standard and Mises' third type of interventionism go hand-in-hand.  They both focus the analyst's attention to the coordination process of the market.  How is new information generated and incorporated into the greater social order?  When obstacles restrict the market's ability to do this, we have catallactic inefficiency and interventionism.

Austrian Economics Forum Spring '12 #4--Kirzner & Cwik

For our fourth meeting, it was decided that we would discuss the paper that I presented at the Austrian Scholars' Conference in Auburn.  While I love to talk about myself, I decided to include a paper by Kirzner as well. 

The Kirzner paper is "The alert and creative entrepreneur: a clarification."  Basically, this is Kirzner responding to supporters and critics of Capitalism and Entrepreneurship, and then telling them that they are all wrong.

Kizner says that his work is not about how to become a successful entrepreneur.  Rather his work focuses on how the market process is set in motion be entrepreneurial decisions.

The interesting points he puts forward is an almost rewritting of his stance on Schumpeter.  He says that everyone knows of Schumpeter's creative-destroyer and so he did not want to dwell on that aspect of entrepreneurship.  He wanted to show how entrepreneurship coordinates the economy.

He then argues that many misinterpreted his writings to say that the entrepreneur was a passive noticer of opportunities.  He says that a false tension was created between the Schumpeterian "bold, disruptive, innovators or [the] passively alert, harmony-restoring responders to changes that have already occurred."  He then states,

[T]here must be scope for both a creative ("Schumpeterian") entrepreneur (one who generates pure profit) and a "passive," alert ("Kirznerian") entrepreneur (one who snuffs out given profit opportunities by promptly exploiting them.) p. 149 (italics in the original)

Cordato argued that his own work tends to connect the two positions.  He argued that we live in an "open-ended universe."  He means that there is no such thing as a final equilibrium to strive for.  In fact, as new information is added, the equilibrium point changes. 

It was based upon this point that we decided that the next week would center on Cordato's book, Efficiency and Externalities in an Open-Ended Universe.  And so we tabled further discussion on this point for the next week.

****************************************************************************
Then the discussion turned to my paper, "Greed in Public and Private Institutions."

My paper, as is too often the case, was based upon frustration.  There is a general attitude that anything that happens in the private sector is due to greed, but when we switch to the nonprofit sector, motives are now made of pure light.  Indeed!

Of course people in every walk of life are greedy.  (As an aside, economists throw out the word "greed" because it cannot be precisely defined.  A typical definition of greed is the wanting of something too much.  However, what is "too much"?  Who decides?  As a result, economists use levels of self-interest.)  Self-interest is omnipresent and it propels Adam Smith's butcher, brewer and baker to serve others.  On the other hand, we have a separation of self-interest and the interest(s) of the overall organization.  It is a question of aligning incentives.  In other words, we are examining a principal-agent problem.  What if Bernie Madoff, Ken Lay or other suitable villain was in charge of the State Department or the US Treasury?  Would we even know what they would be up to?

My paper suggests that two questions arise: Can the institution efficiently allocate resources to satisfy the most intense wants and desires of consumers?  And can the principal-agent problem be overcome to ensure that the leadership will carry out its intended purpose or will the leadership use the entity as a means to a selfish (greedy) end?

In my paper, I looked at three institutional settings: for-profit companies, bureaucracies and nonprofits.  I conclude that the for-profit sector can answer both of the questions.  The bureaucracies cannot calculate efficiency, but it does issue rules, orders and regulations to control and guide the behavior of beaucrats.  It is in this way that bureaucracies have a chance of overcoming the principal-agent problem.  The nonprofit sector, on the other hand, is incapable of answering either question.

Overall, the discussion was friendly and supportive.  During the course of the discussion, Cordato asked a good question, "When it comes to bureaucracies, who are the principals?"  I did not have a ready answer for him.  When I wrote the paper, I had Mises' Bureaucracy in the back of my mind.  In it, he uses the model of a king that basically is in charge issuing orders.  And so in my mind, the king was the principal and the bureaucrat was the agent.  How that translates into a representative government is much more complex.  Although, the point that there is a potential solution remains.

Additionally, a student suggested that when it comes to the nonprofit organizations, we can split them into two groups.  The first group is primarily donation driven, while the second is endowment supported.  The first group "has its feet to the fire."  They must be very aware of what the donors expect, otherwise the funding disappears.  The second group is insulated from today's donors because an endowment has been built up.  (For example, think of colleges and universities that have large endowments.)  They are able to upset today's donors because they have the resources in place for tomorrow.  Of course, such an institution cannot upset significant donors forever, but they have a lot more room to be independent.  This insight certainly adds to the discussion that I make in separating the true-believers from the careerists.

Austrian Economics Forum Fall '11 #5--Chapters 5 & 6

I know that this should have been written up earlier, but life intervened.  I also think that I have been dragging my feet on this entry because I was not particularly impressed with the conclusion of Kirzner's book Competition and Entrepreneurship. 

Is it heresy to say that I did not think that his book was all that great?  Of course Cordato is right when he says that the book needs to be looked at in the context of the time it was written.  However, why hasn't Kirzner released a second edition?  There have been several objections raised about Kirzner's book, so why hasn't he written the second edition to clear up some of the misunderstandings?  I would find it interesting to know if anyone has ever asked him about this.  Anyway to the book...

Chapter Five is an odd chapter.  Eleven pages into it, he says that what you just read is prelude and that we can finally get to his point and the real purpose of the chapter.  Kirzner states:

"I will show that because market phenomena frequently represent the outcomes of long chains of decisions (each one a prerequisite for the later decisions), a market process which is seen as competitive from one point of view may turn out to be monopolistic when evaluated from a different vantage point.  This highly important insight is the real purpose of this chapter, and the discussions thus far are to be viewed as introductory."  p. 198.

Then why did I just bother to read the first eleven pages?  Why not just get to the point?  One of the frustrating things about reading Kirzner, at least for me, is that he is so verbose!  Can we not write a sentence without all the hand-waving and qualifications?  Perhaps this is a product of the time he was writing.  Perhaps it is written this way because this was written in a time where these ideas were not just going against the grain, they were moving in the completely opposite direction.  Okay fine, I'll accept this argument, but still it makes the book exhausting to read.

Okay the ranting is over.

The point that he does (eventually) make is a good one.  We should reject the standard usage of Long- and Short-Runs.  Instead, we should focus on decision points.  At each decision point there is a weighing of options and opportunity costs.  The "Long-Run" then becomes a whole stream of decision points.  It occurs "earlier" in a production process.  The "Short-Run" is a decision point "later" in the production process.  Of course, the terms "earlier" and "later" are problematic.  If we are looking at a production process that is a point-input and point-output, then we can make that distinction.  If the production process is a closed, one-time, system, then we can easily see "earlier" and "later."  Unfortunately, most production processes are not like this.  Most have continuous input and continuous output production periods filled with recursive loops. 

Nevertheless, this is a step in the right direction.  When we start to focus on the nature of the decisions, then instead of talking about Long- and Short- production runs, we can look at "Decision Horizons."  A decision horizon can either be long or short.  The point is that it is the entrepreneur (and the rest of the market indirectly) who is determining the time horizon.  The time horizon is then only useful within the context of the decision.  The result is that we can basically jettison the standard terminology and focus on the contexts without all the misleading verbiage.

Chapter Six's main contribution is to drive home the point that best way to judge the "efficiency" of an economic system is by how well it brings together and incorporates information into active plans and then how well it reacts and adjusts to changes as new information is revealed.  Thus, Kirzner makes the point that the absence of coordination is "inefficiency." (See page 216.)  Perfect Knowledge assumes away this problem.  Thus Kirzner is adopting and extending Hayek's argument in "The Use of Knowledge in Society." 

So when we are to examine the welfare implications of a policy, we need not create some fanciful social utility criterion.  Instead, we look to how well information is absorbed and acted upon.  The entirety of profit and loss calculation becomes the feedback mechanism that we use as the benchmark.  Government's incorporation (of information) and feedback mechanisms are slow and imprecise by comparison.  Thus, we (Auistrian economists) have a very different approach to governmental policies to "solve" market outcomes.  Instead of having some omniscient, god-like bureaucrat standing in judgement over outcomes and adjusting players like pawns on a chess board where every move is as correct as the chalk-board allows, we look to how well does the policy absorb new information.  Then we look to see how well it adjusts as conditions, such as taste and preferences, change. 

If the welfare policy criterion was the only point to come from the book, then I would say that it is worth reading.  Luckily there are many more good points in the book. 

One last dig, I find it odd that Kirzner continuously returns to the Natural Resource Monopolist case.  I think that such a case is so rare that one cannot actually list a historical example of one.  My point is that I think that if we edit those sections out, the book would be greatly improved.  In Kirzner's defense, these are my just my opinions looking at it from a perspective from 39 years after it was written. 

Overall, it must be read by anyone who claims to be an Austrian economist.  It can be a challenge, frustrating at times, and a bit of a slog through several sections, but it frames the debate through which the Austrians approach monopoly theory, welfare theory, entrepreneurship and the role of knowledge for most of the past 40 years.  Do not just read summaries like this to understand Kirzner.  Perhaps I have missed something.  Perhaps a $20-bill-of-knowledge is just sitting there.  You may be more alert to it than I, and then, you'll be able to take advantage of your entrepreneurial acumen and show me up. 

Austrian Economics Forum Fall '11 #4--Selling Costs, Quality and Competition

As you have noticed, I have fallen woefully behind in my commentary for the Austrian Economics Forum, The Austrian Readings Group that meets at North Carolina State University.  This was, in part, due to the birth of the third child.  Since then, my writing has dipped off a bit.  In fact, I was unable to attend the fourth session of the semester, because she was born that day.  So I asked Alex Gill, the Graduate Student who basically put together and runs the AEF, to write up a summary of what happened that session.  In his words…

This week we discussed Chapter Four, "Selling Costs, Quality, and Competition."  Kirzner spends much of the chapter arguing against i) Chamberlin’s (early) views on product quality determination and his distinction between production costs and selling costs and ii) Marshall’s (and Hicks’s) views on advertising.  Most of the chapter was non-controversial to the group since his arguments seem to follow rather directly from his notions of entrepreneurship and competition he developed thus far.  For instance, on product quality he writes:

     In the decision about which quality of product is to be produced the really significant aspect is not how to economize with given resources in attaining given ends, but the alertness with which the producer recognizes the kinds of goods consumers are eager to buy, the kinds of goods available technology and resources can create, and the kinds of resources that can be marshaled.  It is the successful identification of relevant ends and means (rather than the efficient utilization of means to achieve ends) which marks the “right” decision on product quality. (p. 139)

No surprises here.  In similar fashion, he argues that the distinction between production costs (“necessary for a particular product to be forthcoming”) and selling costs (which “alter the demand curve for that product”) is false.  We can’t discuss demand for a nonexistent product, and we can’t distinguish between actions that enhance demand and actions that change the product.  For the same reasons, it is a mistake to argue that advertising provides “a separate, distinct service” from the advertised product itself.  In the course of his argument, though, Kirzner seems to contradict himself when he explicitly concedes (p. 155) that a “substantial portion of advertising may…be viewed as providing a service quite distinct from the advertised product.” 

This statement, in fact, was the starting point for the forum’s discussion.  Kirzner’s theory states that “selling effort” does not allow the separation of information into categories based on relevance or irrelevance with regard to demand determination.  Indeed, the group could not even maintain that an individual could reliably make this distinction in his or her own mind.  When Kirzner says that “some of that information is to be considered as inseparable from the product itself,” perhaps he should have replaced the “some” with “all.”  After brief digressions on the relative merits of Kirzner and Ayn Rand’s personalities and RBC theory, we turned to page 168:

     For us, the crucial question (in evaluating the claim that advertising “monopolistically” differentiates the product in the eyes of the consumer) must always be whether the advertising activities engaged in by the differentiating “monopolist,” are or are not open also to his competitors. (p. 168)

Then can trademarks be anticompetitive?  Not if the trademark is viewed as a contract between the producer and the consumer and competitors are allowed to form their own trademarks.  In a sense, a trademark monopolizes a particular logo, but it also conveys information to the consumer.  A producer who uses another’s trademark is engaging in fraud and misrepresenting the origin of a product.

As would be expected at a gathering like this, the conversation then turned to intellectual property issues in general. 

I was able to attend the last two AEF meetings and will write up and post those after I finish grading Final Exams!

Austrian Economics Forum Fall '11 #3--Competition and Monopoly

This week’s forum focused on the third chapter “Competition and Monopoly” in Kirzner’s book.  Much of the chapter was not controversial to an Austrian audience and so there wasn’t the sort of discussion surrounding it as one might expect with a larger mix of mainstream economists.

In traditional theory, economists envision a continuum in which we place “perfect competition” on one end and “monopoly” on the other.  This method of organizing our thoughts says that the most important aspect of markets is the number of firms.  On the monopoly end, there is one firm, while on the other end there are so many firms that they all face horizontal demand curves.  (As an aside, we really need to get rid of the term “perfect competition” and replace it with “perfect equilibrium,” because there is no competition in that model. It’s an equilibrium-only model.)

Kirzner completely rejects this approach to defining competitive markets.  He wants to use “competition” in the same manner that the average person uses it: as a rivalrous process.  Competition describes actions.  It is a verb.  The mainstream uses competition to describe states of markets.  It is a noun.  The result is that the mainstream cannot communicate to laymen, which Kirzner says has been a “disservice.”

With competition defined as a process, we can then apply it to the entrepreneur.  When the entrepreneur recognizes a market opportunity, he is able to act.  He applies means to achieve ends.  If others wish to use those same means, a rivalry emerges.  In a market, a bidding process arises and the one who outbids the marginal rival is able to employ those means.  It is this process that coordinates the economy.  The move toward equilibrium is an unintended consequence.  The mainstream lacks this function in that the Robbinsian maximizer does not compete.  Kirzner states

Purely Robbinsian economizing activity is never competitive; purely entrepreneurial activity always is.  In other words, I am asserting, that entrepreneurship and competitiveness are two sides of the same coin: that entrepreneurial activity is always competitive and that competitive activity is always entrepreneurial (rather than Robbinsian). (p 94)

The Robbinsian maximizer merely chooses the course according to a given framework and a given set of economic relationships.  In contrast the Kirznerian entrepreneur looks at the unseen and chooses based upon some factors that may be hidden or absent.  The entrepreneur strives for profits and does so by out-competing his rivals.  The “pure Robbinsian decision-maker is not seeking to outdistance his rivals—he is not intent on learning what opportunities they are about to available to the market in order to attempt to make available still more attractive opportunities.” (p 95)

Later (p 108) Kirzner states, “As soon as we draw the cost and revenue curves facing the firm, no matter what their shape, we have created a theoretical case in which all competitive behavior has by definition been ruled out.  What is left is neither competitive nor monopolistic (in the process sense), but a problem in allocation.”  This means that as soon as we assume the structure of the cost curves or the type of demand curves, we have transitioned away from anything competitive and entered into the world of the Robbinsian maximizer.  I think that this analysis goes too far.  In one sense I see exactly what Kirzner is attempting to draw attention to, however I do not see why a sufficiently generic supply and demand graph has to be that way.  If we follow Kirzner, then even imagining curves sends us into the maximizing world.  I think that an economist can look at a static graph and recognize that it is an imperfect representation of a dynamic process.

Kirzner then examines how competition can be limited.  “[F]or us to speak freely of a lack of competitiveness in a market process, we must be able to point to something which prevents market participants from competing. … What is it, …, which might halt the competitive process? … Competition, …, is at least potentially present so long as there exist no arbitrary impediments to entry.” (p 97)  As we can tell, there are several reservations and qualifications in his definition.  Furthermore, we doesn’t define the areas of monopoly in a positive sense, e.g., “you’ll know monopoly when….”  Instead, he defines a potential absence of competition in a negative sense and assumes that the result is monopoly.  Personally, I do not like this approach.  It seems that there is too much hedging.  Is there a reason to be overly cautious?  I do not know.

Later on (p 99), Kirzner gives us a better definition: “When we assert that purely entrepreneurial activity is always competitive, we are then asserting that with respect to purely entrepreneurial activity no possible obstacles to freedom of entry can exist.  We can see this by recalling that purely entrepreneurial activity involves no element of resource ownership. … [B]lockage of entry into a particular activity must arise from restricted access to the resources needed for that activity. … All imaginable obstacles to entry can be reduced, in basic terms, to restricted access to resources.”

To summarize Kirzner’s position, the pure entrepreneur is a metaphysical concept.  It is simply the recognition of a profit opportunity.  There is no way that we can stop a person from recognizing an opportunity.  As a result, all entrepreneurship is competitive and short of direct brain control, it is impossible to curtail this recognition.  Thus, all anti-competitive restrictions have to occur on the level of access to resources.  The restriction of access to resources is a decrease in competition.  A complete restriction is a monopoly.

We talked about the implications of these concepts.  There arise two types of monopolies: one created by a government action and one created through the sole ownership of a resource. While we agreed with the first, the group debated the second concept.

As an aside, it arose that private property is a legal restriction to the access of resources.  I therefore have a monopoly over my car.  While Kirzner does argue that monopoly “diverts the entrepreneurial-competitive process into” other markets, I know that he would not argue that we should abolish private property. (p 107)  Kirzner states, “For us monopoly means the position of a producer who is immune from the threat of other entrepreneurs’ doing what he does.” (p 106)  However, it seems that for Kirzner, monopoly is not necessarily a bad thing.  I suspect that he will cover this in more detail later in the book.

Mises argues that intervention in the market distorts the market.  When the government buys pencils, it is not disrupting the normal market process and thus this is merely a shifting in supply and demand curves.  When the government imposes rules that prevent the market from doing its job, we have permanent discoordination.  For example, a maximum price set below the market price will create a permanent shortage.  I see Kirzner using the same logic in the background of his analysis.  When a monopoly exists due to legal barriers, we see the market unable to perform its job and this is bad.  If there is a monopoly that arises from ownership, then the market curves shift and the market adjusts.

The next item that we discussed was the idea of monopoly rent.  This is the return that a monopolist gains because he is a monopolist.  It is an addition to the return on the other factors of production, in which we are including entrepreneurial profit.  We found it difficult to separate these rents from the concept of entrepreneurial profit.  Luckily, Kirzner does not use it in his welfare appraisal of the monopoly.  Instead, he uses “the speed and smoothness with which misallocations can be discovered and corrected” (p 112) as his basis of comparison.  This definition directly parallels Mises’ definition on interventionism, where the focus (for monopoly) is directed to the obstacle to entry.

We then touched on some relatively random points.  We found them thought provoking and interesting enough to comment on.

Kirzner states, “for our notion of monopoly the shape of the demand curve facing the firm is of little significance. … [T]he significance of monopoly does not relate to the theory of the firm at all. (It is because of this that the shape of the demand curve is irrelevant.)” (p 108)  The importance of this comment is that the mainstream focuses on the firm (and the industry) and the consequent shape of the curves that the firms face.  Austrians have long rejected this static view of Industrial Organization.  Instead, we focus on the competitive process, on the action, on the verb.

Kirzner has a discussion on Monopolistic Competition, in which we basically throw the concept out.  In characteristic Kirzner fashion he cannot make a strong, direct statement and instead says, “The position developed thus far in this book makes it impossible for me to accept this approving judgment on the theory of monopolistic competition.” (p 113)  More directly he states, “the theory of monopolistic competition was on balance a decidedly unfortunate episode in the history of modern economic thought.” (p 114)  The problem was, of course, the fact that when it threw out the old perfect competition model, it left out the competition (in the Austrian sense).

Kirzner then has a nice discussion (pp 115-117) on how only in disequilibrium does product differentiation exists.  There is no reason to change product quality in a world of equilibrium.

Kirzner then delivers the one-two punch to monopolistic competition:

Thus far my criticism of the monopolistic competition view of the market has charged it (a) with overlooking the simplest available explanation of such phenomena as product differentiation …, and (b) with gratuitously advancing an alternative explanation ascribing these phenomena to the presence of monopolistic elements. … The explanation provided by the theory of monopolistic competition not only fails to recognize the disequilibrium character of the phenomena it seeks to explain, it fails even as an equilibrium theory. (p 117)

Nice.

Finally Kirzner compares his concept of the entrepreneur with that of Schumpeter’s concept. They both reject the model of perfect competition.  Schumpeter does so on the grounds that entrepreneurs are disruptive to all equilibria.  They create something new which then explodes all the old economic relationships.  Kirzner does not deny that this occurs, but is merely a subset of his “alertness to hitherto unnoticed opportunities.”  The difference then rests on Kirzner’s emphasis.  He says that the primary function of the entrepreneur is to coordinate resources, the result of which is the movement towards equilibrium.  For Schumpeter, the coordination process is secondary and mundane.

The next meeting has been changed. Instead of meeting in 2 weeks (October 14th), it will convene in 3 (October 21st).  This development is unfortunate for me since that is the day that we have scheduled the trip to the hospital for the new (girl) baby’s arrival.  Since the surgery is scheduled for the morning, in theory I could make it to the afternoon meeting. (Yeah, right!)  So I will try to recruit someone to write up a summary for that session.  We’ll see.

Austrian Economics Forum Fall '11 #2--The Entrepreneur

This session's Austrian Economics Forum dealt with Chapter 2, "The Entrepreneur" in Israel Kirzner's book, Competition and Entrepreneurship.  We had a dozen people attend this session, in which there were three Austrian Economists with PhDs.  Additionally there was Dr. Margolis, who is a close fellow traveller, and who we are very happy to have join us each week.  (I wonder if there are many other regular Austrian discussion sessions with such a line up each time.)

Israel M. Kirzner

The opening question centered on whether Kirzner's construction of the "pure entrepreneur" is a useful concept.  While it is obvious that Kirzner is discussing an archetype and that no such purity must exist in the real world, the central points that we were wrestling with was whether the pure entrepreneur acts and the implications derived from our conclusion.  According to Mises, acting is the application of means to achieve ends.  Kirzner's entrepreneur does not use means at all.  Kirzner states that the entrepreneurial "decision was made before the original act of purchase...." (p. 50)  He simply recognizes profit opportunities.  So Kirzner's pure entrepreneur never acts, at least in the Austrian sense.  Is a non-acting entrepreneur a fruitful concept in Austrian Economics?  The discussion group has not reached a conclusion. 

Furthermore, Kirzner argues that the pure entrepreneur receives a return for recognizing the profit opportunity.  As I understand it, Kirzner argues that after all the factor payments are paid out, there is a residual.  From that residual must be subtracted the implicit return to the entrepreneur’s use of his own money and his time, the opportunity costs of these subjective factors.  So the amount that then remains (above the opportunity costs) is the return to the pure entrepreneur.

However, my question is, "How can a non-actor earn a return?"  We speculated that the pure entrepreneur "acts" by conveying information to the resource owner.  Under the Misesian definition, this is clearly a no, but even under the normal usage of "acting" it is a stretch.  Later in the chapter, Kirzner references Mises article, "Profit and Loss."  I found this curious because in it, Mises has sa very different definition of entrepreneur.  Mises states,

"There is a simple rule of thumb to tell entrepreneurs from non-entrepreneurs. The entrepreneurs are those on whom the incidence of losses on the capital employed falls. Amateur-economists may confuse profits with other kinds of intakes. But it is impossible to fail to recognize losses on the capital employed."

A key point is that the entrepreneur acts and opens himself up to potential losses.  Where's loss for Kirzner's Entrepreneur?  Where is the possibility of entrepreneurial error?  How does this error fit into the overall picture?  Furthermore, if we are looking at the structure of the firm, where is the responsibility within the firm?  Mises would say that it is the owner/entrepreneur, but it seems that Kirzner would split those functions.  So would the ultimate responsibility fall on the decision-maker, the resource owner and not the entrepreneur?

So, if the pure entrepreneur does not act, is this a step in the wrong direction?  The Austrians have consistently argued that the entrepreneur is central to coordinating the market.  Is creating this ideal type of a non-acting entrepreneur a direction that Austrians want to take?  I am not convinced that this is a proper course for Austrians.  It is clear that this issue will continue to develop as we progress through the book.  My thoughts are that under the standard definition of action (purposeful behavior), which is typically employed by Austrians, we should reject Kirzner's pure entrepreneur.  However, I might change my mind after we finish the book.

At this point the discussion turned to why Kirzner would employ such an abstract concept.  Our conclusion is that he was trying to draw the greatest possible distinction between his construct of the entrepreneur and Lord Robbins' maximizer (RM).  (While Kirzner uses the RM for comparison, I have been thinking that perhaps we might want to use the Walrasian auctioneer instead.)  It seems that the central reason why he wants to contrast with the RM is because the RM simply reacts and crunches numbers in response to changing conditions.  So here Kirzner is arguing that the entrepreneur is better because he is discovering new conditions about potential futures.  Without this recognition of discoordinations (profit opportunities) then we could at best stumble into superior (coordinating) moves.  The exploitation of the profit opportunities moves the market (unintentionally) toward a more coordinated state.

There was some discussion of moving the economy toward some "Ultimate Equilibrium" but that was quickly rejected.  On the other hand there is a discoordinating aspect of the actions of these owner/entrepreneurs.  Schumpeter's contribution to entrepreneurship theory is that the entrepreneur is essentially a destroyer of old methods of production and a creator of new equilibria.  Kirzner downplays this aspect and focuses on the coordinating role of the entrepreneur.  Contrasting with Schumpeter, Kirzner sees the entrepreneur as a responder to and "not as a source of innovative ideas."  (p. 74)  The entrepreneur must be alert to opportunities that already exist.  Cordato pointed out that in an open universe, inventing is equilibrating (in a sense), but the actions of the entrepreneur are not always coordinating, at least not in the short-run.
 
A causal reading of Kirzner might lead one to conclude that he rejects the creative feature of entrepreneurship, but the word Kirzner uses is "emphasis."  He states, "By contrast my own treatment of the entrepreneur emphasizes the equilibrating aspects of his role." [italics added]  I do not see Kirzner as completely rejecting Schumpeter’s creative-destroyer, but simply shifting the focus to the entrepreneur’s coordinating role.

We then shifted gears to address Mises’ claim that “every actor is always an entrepreneur.” (Human Action (1949), p. 253.)  The reasoning is this, if all ends are subjectively determined and since these ends are necessarily projections of potential future states, then there is uncertainty surrounding the means to employ to achieve these ends.  With the uncertainty, we move away from the perfect knowledge of the RM in the state of (so-called) “perfect competition,” and we move into the world of the Austrians.  With this uncertainty, there is an opportunity for pure gain to come from pure entrepreneurial insight.

Margolis posed the question, "Have we lost the separation with the Robbinsian maximizer if all are entrepreneurial?"  I would have to say yes.  There are no given payoffs and production functions without Kirznerian entrepreneur.  I do not recall who said it, but a wonderful insight was made, “Means are not given, they must be perceived.”  Additionally, there is a separation between acting and reacting.  The Robbinsian maximizer is clearly reacting.  There are outside stimuli and the maximizer adjusts.  "Robbinsian decision-making ... see ends and means as data."  (p. 78 fn 34)  The Austrian conception of the owner/entrepreneur is that he enters the market with knowledge and acts upon profit opportunities.  The unintended consequence is the addition of information into the market and a higher degree of coordination. 

So now we have it straight.  The Kirznerian pure entrepreneur stands in sharp contrast to the Robbinsian Maximizer in that the RM merely reacts to outside stimuli.  The Kirznerian entrepreneur differs with the Schumpeterian entrepreneur in that the primary role of the Kirznerian version is coordinating while the other discoordinates.  The Kirznerian pure entrepreneur differs from the Misesian concept because the pure entrepreneur does not act and only perceives.  Right?

And then we come to page 84 where Kirzner says, "It is the deliberate exploitation of perceived opportunities which is essential to the entrepreneurial role."  Does this radically change Kirzner’s pure entrepreneur?  Now he acts.  That implies using means, which implies resources.  Was the pure entrepreneur a long side step?  I argued that this statement should just be thrown out.  Cordato argued that the payoff is the distinction between Robbinsian maximizer and the pure entrepreneur.  However, I think Palasek got it right.  She pointed out that he is using “entrepreneurial role” here and not concept of the pure entrepreneur.  The use of the word role does indicate that he has taken a step away from his pure entrepreneur.  I am not sure exactly where this leaves us.  Clearly, reading Kirzner is difficult.  I am hoping that more will develop along these lines in the later chapters.

I had one further observation.  The definition of the entrepreneur from the French is from entreprendre, to undertake, one who undertakes a project, or an “undertaker.”  This definition of the entrepreneur follows in the tradition of Cantillon, Turgot, Say, Menger and the Austrian School.  The mainstream tradition of Smith, Ricardo, Mill, Walras, and Marshall has tended to neglect the entrepreneur and his function.  While Kirzner is clearly emphasizing the role of entrepreneur, his definition of the pure (non-acting) entrepreneur does not fit within older the Austrian tradition.  He has broken new ground.  For this reason alone, Kirzner is worth reading.